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GOD SAVE US FROM THE COERCION
TEST: CONSTITUTIVE
DECISIONMAKING, POLITY
PRINCIPLES, AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM
Ronald C. Kahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The coercion principle states that the government must not
coerce individuals m their free exercise of religion. The major
premises of the Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen articles are that
the Rehnquist Court will (and should) decide Establishment Clause
cases using this principle and that Lee v. Weisman' should be read
as supporting the coercion test in Establishment Clause cases.2  I
disagree. There is no convincing evidence in Weisman that Justice
Kennedy and a majority of the Court has accepted a simple coer-
cion test.
I also argue against Professor Paulsen's view that the Lemon
v. Kurtzman test3 is dead. I argue that a majority of the Rehnquist
Court, including Justice Kennedy, will continue to support the
polity or institutional separation prong of the Lemon test, that there
be no excessive government entanglement with religion, and its
* Professor of Politics, Oberlin College.
i. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. See Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993);
Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of Religion: The Beginning
of the End to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917
(1993).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test requires that for a law
or government policy to be upheld under the Establishment Clause it must 1) have a
secular purpose, 2) have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and 3) not foster excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
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corollary, that the Court should ensure that political divisiveness
does not result from government laws and actions regarding reli-
glon.4 The question of whether the Rehnquist Court continues to
support the vitality of the Lemon test is not identical to the ques-
tion of whether the Court eschews polity-based institutional entan-
glement and fear of political divisiveness concerns in favor of a
coercion test. The primary issue is not whether Lemon is dead;
rather, it is whether the polity elements of the Lemon test will
continue to be important to the Rehnquist Court. In contrast to
Paulsen, I argue that the Rehnquist Court will continue to enforce
the polity elements of Lemon. Paulsen may be making a valid
argument that the Lemon test will not be applied in the future in
its full-blown form, as a fixed test in root and branch.5 However,
if this is so, it is not a very great change because the Lemon test
has never been applied as if it were a closed-ended legal code.
Different prongs (or seeds) of the Lemon test have come to the
fore in different cases.6 I argue that such application will continue
into the future because a majority of the Rehnquist Court agrees
that each of the prongs of the Lemon test, including its polity
principles, will continue to inform Establishment Clause deci-
sionmaking.7
To conflate free exercise and institutional polity principles
within the Establishment Clause into a simple principle based on
4. Id. at 622-23 (The Court supported the institutional separation prong by describing
the divisive political potential of government entanglement with religion. The Court cau-
tioned, "Political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect.").
5. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 861-62 (In closing, Professor Paulsen states that unless
there are significant changes in the makeup of the Supreme Court, Lemon will never
again be used as the sole basis in deciding Establishment Clause cases.).
6. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (focusing on the exces-
sive entanglement prong of Lemon in deciding whether the charitable contributions provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (focusing on a lack of any secular purpose in a state's law regarding
voluntary school prayer); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state law
allowing tax deductions for certain private school expenses incurred by parents by focus-
mg on the primary effect prong of Lemon).
7. See LEONARD W LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 75-119 (1986) (a most powerful statement for the separation of church and
state and against the non-preferentialist position). See also Douglas Laycock, "Non-Prefer-
ential" Aid To Religion: A False Claim About Onginal Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
875, 875 (1986) (arguing that history refutes claims that "the Framers specifically intended
to permit government to aid religion so long as that aid does not prefer one religion over
others.") Professor Laycock has written extensively arguing against non-preferentialism as
the underlying principle of the Establishment Clause.
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freedom from government coercion, and to negate the excessive
entanglement and political divisiveness elements of the Lemon test,
as Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen do, undermines important
concerns by the Founders regarding the negative effects of religious
conflict on the political system.' Moreover, this conflation makes
it more difficult for the Court to protect, and society to honor, the
free exercise rights of all citizens.
Important evidence for the proposition that a majority of the
Rehnquist Court will not accept a simple free exercise, rights-
based, coercion test as the sole or primary basis for Establishment
Clause decisionmaking is also provided by the joint opinion of
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter m Planned Parenthood v.
Casey9 and opinions m other cases decided at the time of
Weisman."° This evidence is in the form of clearly stated premis-
es, polity principles, about the importance of stare decisis, the role
of the Court, and the responsibilities of the Court, which would be
violated were the Court to denude the Establishment Clause of
polity principles.
To conflate polity and rights principles within the Establish-
ment Clause also runs counter to the constitutive decisionmaking
process on the Supreme Court, in which polity and rights principles
and their relationship inform constitutional choices, of which the
Lemon test is a product." The Lemon test brought together long-
standing Establishment Clause polity and rights principles as ap-
plied in many precedents.
Therefore, tlus article will first discuss polity and rights princi-
ples, the constitutive Supreme Court decisionmaking process, and
their relationship to Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Only by
8. See also, Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939 (1986) (analyzing the history of the Religion Clauses
and concluding that they were designed to remedy the problem of government coercion).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
10. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); R.A.V v. St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992).
11. See RONALD C. KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTTnuTONAL THEORY 1953
-1993 31-56 (forthcoming 1994) (a full discussion of the constitutive decision-making
process on the Supreme Court).
12. See Ronald C. Kahn, Ideology, Religion, and the First Amendment, in JUDGING
THE CONSTITUTION 409 (Gerald L. Houseman & Michael W. McCann eds., 1989) [here-
inafter Kahn, First Amendment]; Ronald C. Kahn, Polity and Rights Values in Conflict:
The Burger Court, Ideological Interess, and the Separation of Church and State, 3 STUD.
IN AM. POL DEV. 279 (1989) [hereinafter Kahn, Polity and Rights Values] (both discus-
sing the terms of polity and rights pnnciples and providing an analysis of Supreme Court
Establishment Clause opinions between 1970 and 1,986, which demonstrate that members
M93]
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placing Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this
larger framework can the limitations of Dean Smith's and Professor
Paulsen's arguments that the Rehnquist Court is on a path to es-
chewing polity principles in the Establishment Clause and Lemon
test be understood fully 13 The Casey decision offers important
evidence to counter the argument that the coercion test will become
the Establishment Clause test on the Rehnquist Court.
II. CONSTITUTIVE SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING
The constitutive decislonmaking process on the Supreme
Court, in which polity and rights principles and their relationship
inform Court choices, has been a long-standing pattern in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence and in all doctrinal areas. Approach-
es to constitutional interpretation, the debate between the federalists
and the antifederalists at the founding, and modem Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, include the ongoing debate over which polity
and rights principles should inform Court decisionmaking and the
development of constitutional law A major problem of the free
exercise coercion test that is defended by Dean Smith and Profes-
sor Paulsen is that they fail to consider the proper balance between
polity and rights principles. In short, they espouse a rights-only
based test.
Polity and rights principles, therefore, are central to under-
standing the Supreme Court decisionmaking process, the consti-
tutional choices made by each justice, and differences in
decisionmaking and jurisprudence among Court eras. Polity pnnci-
ples are justices' deeply-held ideas about where decisionmakmg
power should be located when deciding questions of constitutional
significance. Polity principles involve beliefs about whether courts
of the Supreme Court applied polity and rights principles in a coherent way as they de-
cided cases).
13. See generally Smith, supra note 2; Paulsen, supra note 2. I will not explore
Smith's interesting ideas about the problems caused by the Rehnquist Court's elusive and
undefined concept of coercion or of the problems presented by protecting the right of
conscience rather than religious freedom because I don't view this as the primary problem
with Smith's and Paulsen's view of Weisman and the Rehnquist Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Instead, I argue the primary problem with their analyses is that they
assume that free exercise rights are, and should be, the sole basis for Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. This assumption will undermine not only religious freedom and the
rights of the non-religious, but also undermine the strength of religious organizations in
our pluralist political system. Nor do I focus on Smith's and Paulsen's concerns for great-
er clarity of coercion test principles or their concerns about ensuring a clearer distinction
between protecting freedom of religion and freedom of conscience.
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or electorally accountable political institutions are the most appro-
priate forum for constitutional decisionmaking. They also include
beliefs about whether state, local, or national levels of government
are proper forums for the making of constitutionally significant
decisions.
Polity principles may be formal in nature and involve ques-
tions of the separation of powers between the President, Congress,
and the Court, checks and balances, federalism, and the relationship
between government and religious institutions, as in the Establish-
ment Clause. The term "polity prmciples" may also refer to less
formal views about the American political system held by justices,
such as their views about how well the pluralist political system is
operating and how complex or simply justices and Court eras view
structural inequality as a basis for the Court increasing its power of
judicial review Polity principles inform the debate in constitutional
law, practice, and theory about whether federal courts or electorally
accountable institutions should make choices, and, as a matter of
principle, the degree of institutional autonomy that should be grant-
ed to electorally accountable institutions and courts.
Courts must decide how much weight polity principles should
be given when balanced against individual rights, which are usually
of a less defined and potentially more substantive open-ended na-
ture. Thus, at their most persuasive, judicial choices based on poli-
ty values are grounded structurally on powers enumerated in the
Constitution, polity principles which are informed by these powers,
and the overall principles of governance in the Constitution. For
some justices these values imply judicial self-restraint, reliance on
existing political power structures, and a firm faith in
participational and access norms to ensure a normally-functioning
democratic system. The polity principles of other justices lead them
to favor judicial activism and support expanded individual rights by
the Supreme Court as a counter to what they perceive as malfunc-
tions in the political system.
Rights principles are beliefs held by justices, as well as judi-
cial advocates and constitutional scholars, concerning individual
rights - in contrast to polity questions concerning the function
and role of proper government. Rights principles do not usually
include issues of power among branches of the majoritanan politi-
cal process. Instead, they involve protections afforded individuals
based on fundamental principles in the Constitution and in its
amendments, such as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Rights may be "thou shalt not" prohibitions against govern-
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ment interference with the liberty of individuals or groups, such as
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. They
also may constitute, as in modem equal protection law, federal
courts' determinations of affirmative responsibilities on the part of
government. Rights may include the assurance that goods and ser-
vices that are allocated by legislatures and declared essential to life
and liberty be distributed under a set of rules and processes that
are neither capricious nor arbitrary Rights principles force one to
think of the individual or group and about liberties, like freedom
of speech or the right to privacy, that inhere in the individual.
Polity values force one to think about the nature of governmental
powers, the political process, or the judicial process, as an entity
Thus, while polity and rights principles may be viewed as analyti-
cally distinct for heuristic purposes, in the analysis of cases they
work together to form the bases of an individual justice's approach
to constitutional questions, and changing doctrine in different Court
eras. 14
As an example of the importance of polity and rights princi-
ples in individual cases consider Planned Parenthood v. Casey.15
In their joint majority opinion, Justices Souter, O'Connor, and
Kennedy emphasized that they could not overturn the right of
abortion choice first pronounced in Roe v. Wade,' 6 m large part
because doing so would violate their deeply-held polity principles,
such as respect for stare decists, the role of the Supreme Court as
a counter-majoritarian institution, in our system of separation of
powers and checks and balances, and the autonomy of the Court
from day-to-day electoral politics.' 7 Clearly, in this case, as in
others, the justices did not just decide the case based on their
policy wants or a simple view of fundamental rights, but instead
decided the case based on their commitment to polity principles,
such as the need to follow precedent and views about the power of
14. See KAHN, supra note 11, at 36-38.
15. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992),
16. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
17. In Casey, the Court explicitly mentioned "the force of stare decisis" as a primary
reason for declining to overrule Roe. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808. Additionally, the Court
reasoned that overruling the holding in Roe would "seriously weaken the Court's capacity
to exercise judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to
the rule of law." Id. at 2814. The Court also discussed the need for decisions to be
"grounded truly in principle" and not merely "compromises with social and political pres-
sures." Id.
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judicial review that they viewed as basic to a rule of law 18
Changing points of intersection between polity and rights
principles in specific cases, in decisions of individual justices, in
the constitutional theories of Court scholars, and in different Court
eras are central to understanding the constitutive decisionmaking
process of the Supreme Court, in which justices draw on polity
and rights principles to make their constitutional choices. No jus-
tice relies exclusively on a pure polity or rights theory, but differ-
ent justices, scholars, and Court eras might place greater emphasis
on one over the other. The relative weights given to constitutional
questions concerning polity compared to rights principles have
changed throughout the history of our nation. Polity principles con-
tinue to mform the development of constitutional law in cases
primarily concerned with the nature of individual rights.
The way polity and rights principles dovetail, or fail to dove-
tail, in each Court era defines the Court. Justices seek coherence in
polity and rights principles to increase their influence over the
development of constitutional principles within the Court and wider
society Members of the Supreme Court create personal constitu-
tional visions in which their views of polity and rights principles,
their underlying moral values, and their attitudes towards the histo-
ry of the Court and the nation, are central. These personal theories,
which inform judicial choices, develop over the course of a
justice's years on the Court. The concern for coherence by a jus-
tice means that she cannot think only of the case outcomes, or the
individual case, but rather must consider implications of her choice
for her later application of polity and rights principles.19
Finally, constitutional theories and interpretations which em-
phasize only polity or only rights principles, and not both, and thus
undervalue the connectedness of polity and rights principles, result
in misinterpreting what the Supreme Court does when it makes
constitutional choices and fail as guides to future Court action.
Tins has been the case with regard to the theories of many con-
stitutional scholars since the 1970s, such as John Hart Ely and
Laurence Tribe, who argued for theories based on either polity or
individual rights prnciples, respectively 2 As I will argue below,
18. Id. at 2808-09.
19. See generally Kahn, First Amendment, supra note 12 (discussing the terms polity
and rights prnciples, as applied to the Burger Court's aid to paroclual education cases);
Kahn, Polity and Rights Values, supra note 12 (same).
20. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 92 (1980) (arguing that the onginal
19931
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this is also a major problem with employing the free exercise
rights only-based coercion test of Smith and Paulsen to Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.
An analysis of the interplay of polity and substantive rights
values, and of the justices' ideological interests in support of dif-
ferent concepts of polity and rights values, indicates that under our
liberal tradition rights are usually linked to polity values, and are
subject to the justices' views of institutional relationships in soci-
ety Through the analysis of cases we can assess to what extent
each justice has a set of polity and rights priorities. From such an
analysis we can see differences in the manner in which various
justices make principled choices, and the implications of different
types of principles for the development of constitutional theories.
In particular, this approach allows us to pinpoint differences
among the justices, and scholars, as to the degree to which they
view constitutional law as prescriptive of public official and citizen
action, and whether they trust political institutions or other venues,
such as churches, to make choices of constitutional significance.
Justices decide cases by fitting them into their continuing polity
and substantive rights values rather than by deciding outcomes and
then making any argument they can in support of the outcome.
Justices are ideological in the sense that these polity and rights
principles provide definable limits on the range of values that they
can use in development of more innovative Court doctrine. The
volatility of such principles indicates not a tendency on behalf of
the Court to engage in simplistic bargaining as the hallmark of its
activity, but rather, an "ideological jurisprudence" that is highly
motivated and highly competitive, with certain ends clearly in sight
for all justices who hold such principles as key elements of their
informed knowledge about an increasingly complex polity Thus,
justices differ in the way they view and balance polity and rights
Constitution was "dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the identifica-
tion of specific substantive rights"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1980) (arguing that the
most crucial commitments of the Constitution define "the values that we as a society,
acting politically, must respect"). See also KAHN, supra note 11, at 330-79 (providing a
statement of the problems of the Ely and Tribe approaches to constitutional interpretation);
Ronald C. Kahn, Process and Rights Pnnciples in Modern Constitutional Theory (Book
Review), 36 STAN. L. REv. 253, 253, 255 (1984) (reviewing JOHN AGRESTO, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)) (discussing Tribe as arguing for
an interpretation of the Constitution as protection for individual rights against government
action and characterizing Ely as a scholar who uses complex polity concepts in his work).
990 [Vol. 43:983
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principles, and whether they see them as rigid or permeable; in
these differences we can explain the growth of constitutional law
and see how the wider society and interpretive community are in a
dialogue with the Supreme Court.
HI. THE FOUNDING, POLITY AND RIGHTS PRINCIPLES, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The juxtaposition of polity and rights visions has informed the
development of constitutional law throughout the centuries, with the
balance between polity and rights visions changing over time.
Historically, the clash between polity and rights principles extends
back to the founding period, when the Article VII structural credo
necessary for ratification of the Constitution at the Philadelphia
Convention was countered, or, for some, buttressed by the first ten
amendments. In the founding period a central issue was the distri-
bution of power among state/local and national political institutions.
The Founders perceived this issue as a question of whether individ-
ual rights could be better protected by securing polity principles in
the Constitution - establishing limits on national or state power
- as compared to protecting individual rights by stating them in
the Bill of Rights or stating that natural rights, not listed in the
Bill of Rights or the body of the Constitution, continue neverthe-
less to exist."1
Of central concern to both federalists and antifederalists was
whether governing bodies of small or large constituencies offer
better protection for individual rights. The antifederalists wanted to
protect state sovereignty because they felt that states, being smaller
and more homogeneous in composition, would be better forums for
the teaching of civic virtue and for deliberation. They questioned
the federalist assumption that national political institutions and the
separation of powers under a theory of national supremacy of law
would protect citizen rights, add to the confidence of citizens in
the Constitution and the new governing institutions, and protect
against the problem of majority and minority factions, a key con-
cern of the federalists.
The federalist theory of government won out over
antifederalist arguments. This occurred, in part, because some of
21. See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1439-40
(1987) (arguing that the Constitution was a comprormse to create a government that is
powerful yet with limitations placed on its exercise of power).
1993]
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the antifederalists themselves feared that the effects of minority
factions m the states would retard the economic development and
military security of the nation. Yet, the antifederalists, having lost
most of the battles over polity principles, secured the listing of
individual rights against intrusion by the national government in
the Bill of Rights and the main body of the Constitution. Both
federalists and antifederalists saw the power of judicial review and
judges' lifetime tenure as a means to limit the effects of faction.
Thus, the relationship between the structure of polity and the
protection of individual rights was of central concern to both the
antifederalists and the federalists. The syntax of this period me-
volved the question of what governmental structures might better
protect individual rights and the aggregate interests of all the citi-
zens and the nation as a whole, and thus secure the confidence of
the people in the government and the Constitution.'
We must understand Establishment Clause principles at the
Founding and the presence of separate Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses as part of this larger picture in our evaluation of
whether Establishment Clause jurisprudence should rest on a coer-
cion test, incorporating only Establishment Clause free exercise
principles. In regard to the Establishment Clause, polity principles
inform the relationship between public bodies and private religious
institutions, as well as between the government and believers and
non-believers, not in their role as holders of free exercise rights,
but rather as citizens and public officials concerned about political
stability I say this because many polity principles in the Establish-
ment Clause, such as a limitation on the entanglement between
government and religion, speak both to the government's relation-
ship to the learning process, and teachers' and students' religious
values within parochial schools and the ability of religious rnstitu-
tions to be free of government direction, support, or opposition.
Polity arguments in church and state cases are balanced
against the substantive rights interests of individuals, religious
minorities, or nonbelievers who cannot count on the institutional
support of polity-oriented outcomes for protection.23 Rights protec-
22. See GERALD GARVEY, CONSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE 9-25 (1971) (discussing a syn-
tactical approach that explores the fit between law and changes in political culture to the
study of constitutional law and politics).
23. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon relgious nunorities to conform to the prevailing officially
[Vol. 43:983
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tion requires the courts to take a more positive, interventiomst role,
at least potentially Hence, conflicts over dual obligations are at the
heart of the Establishment Clause. Free exercise rights central to
deciding questions of government establishment of religion are
conceived of as either external or internal to a religious institution
or activity The religious atmosphere of society and government
external to the institutions in question is at issue. Free exercise
rights for believers and nonbelievers in a generally hospitable polit-
ical and cultural environment is the ideal. The question of how the
state may encourage such an environment without involng the
clear requirement of the Establishment Clause that the government
not signal its support for one religion, or for religion versus
non-religion, remains.
The rights principles in church and state cases also involve
what I shall label an internal right to individual free exercise of
religion within particular institutions. Justices differ as to the exter-
nal free exercise rights of believers and nonbelievers and the de-
gree to which internal free exercise rights need protection from
government intrusion. The question before the justices has not been
whether to sanction individual rights or guarantees, but rather how
to best integrate and accommodate the general logic of the doctrine
regarding separation of church and state and free exercise rights
within modem society Thus, the Religion Clauses ask the Court to
look at both polity (institutional separation) and substantive rights
(free exercise) principles.
Analysis of religious liberty and separation of church and
state, like property, are part of the broader separation of thought
and reality into public/political and private/civil spheres under
liberal theory 24 This tension has allowed for much leeway in ju-
dicial policy-making and, has generated a surprisingly wide spec-
trum of disputes in modem judicial interpretations of church and
state doctrine, which center around both polity and rights principles
in the Establishment Clause.
approved religion is plain."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (Douglas,
I., dissenting) ("A legislature of Christians can no more make minorities conform to their
weekly regune than a legislature of Moslems, or a legislature of Hindus. The religious
regime of every group must be respected - unless it crosses the line of criminal con-
duct.").
24. See KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 24, 26
(Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (discussing the relationship of religious liberty and the
separation of church and state to larger questions of the separate public and private
spheres in liberal theory).
19931
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Absolute state neutrality toward any religion - the
"wall-of-separation" judicial view - has had some prominent
adherents on the Court, and the Court abides mainly to a strict
adherence to the prohibitions imposed on the government by the
Establishment Clause. s Tis principle of hermetically sealed, ex-
clusive spheres of church or state is a polity principle that many
justices have seen as unrealistic in the light of modern-day com-
plexity Other justices see separation as the only means of main-
taming the integrity of religious practice and principled adjudication
by the Supreme Court in protection of such rights.26 For Dean
Smith and Professor Paulsen, the Establishment Clause's institution-
al separation polity principles are viewed as a restriction on gov-
ernment, as limiting state accommodation to religion.27 They view
sole reliance on the free exercise-based coercion test, the eschewing
of all polity principles, as the way out of this dilemma.
IV THE COERCION TEST, WEISMAN, AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen argue that Lee v.
Weisman,28 Texas Monthly v. Bullock,29 and Allegheny County v.
25. See, e.g., Robert F. Kane & Fred M. Blum, The International Year of Bible
Reading - The Unconstitutional Use of the Political Process to Endorse Religion, 8
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 333, 346-47 (1991) ("In 1947 the Supreme Court recognized
that the establishment clause was intended, m the words of Thomas Jefferson, to erect 'a
wall of separation between Church and State. In recent years, however, Jefferson's wall
of separation has been besieged and some justices have even threatened to dismantle it.
Nevertheless, most acknowledge that, at a mimmum, the establishment clause means that
neither Congress nor states may pass a law which grants a preference to a particular
religion or sect.").
26. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurnng) (stating that "the Establishment Clause [is] a co-guarantor, with
the Free Exercise Clause, of relgious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of
religious beliefs to either clause alone."). See also Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of
the Establishment Clause, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1711 (1992) (noting Justice
Brennan's implicit suggestion "that a separation of church and state is necessary for reli-
gious liberty").
27. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 810 ("The First Amendment does require 'separation' or
'non-entanglement, but it does so as a matter of the Free Exercise Clause's protection of
religion from government intrusion on personal and institutional religious autonomy. That
is, religion may be entitled to a private sphere separate and independent from its regula-
tions."); Smith, supra note 2, at 930-35 (argwng that it is clear that the majority mn
Weisman viewed the Establishment Clause as significantly limiting government coercion of
conscience).
28. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
29. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
[Vol. 43:983
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ACLU30 offer clear evidence that the Rehnquist Court is moving
towards a free exercise, rights only coercion test as the basis for
its Establishment Clause decisionmaking. In so doing they must
expect that the traditional constitutive decisionmaking process does
not apply to Establishment Clause cases. They advocate a constitu-
tional theory of the Establishment Clause that is based only on free
exercise principles.
Their primary concerns center on the lack of clarity, and sub-
stance, of the components of the Rehnquist Court's coercion test
found in Weisman and prior decisions. Dean Smith views his pri-
mary contribution as making suggestions as to how the Court can
improve and clarify coercion principles.31 Professor Paulsen, using
more dramatic language, cheers the death of the Lemon test, and
the use of polity principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
and advocates that the Court stop waffling in establishing the coer-
cion test so that government can accommodate religions and the
religious.32
Dean Smith mistakenly argues that the Rehnquist Court is
willing to focus on free exercise rights as at the core of Estab-
lishment Clause principles:
Weisman and Texas Monthly -demonstrate that the Court is
willing to permit government accommodation of conscience
under the aegis of the Establishment Clause [T]he
Court is willing to focus on the notion of conscience in
Establishment Clause cases and often refers to that notion
as a right. Unfortunately, however, the Court has been
distracted by disagreements over coercion and endorsement,
and has ignored the need to pursue questions raised by the
use of conscience - the term of preference for the majori-
ty in Establishment Clause analysis.
33
Polity principles raised by an endorsement test are viewed as a
distraction to what is really needed: a coercion test with clear
principles of how to protect free exercise rights as at the core of
the Establishment Clause. We see Dean Smith's emphasis on view-
30. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
31. Smith, supra note 2, at 957 (arguing that the Supreme Court needs to formulate a
coercion theory).
32. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 833-34 (arguing for refinement to the coercion test if it
is to be a permanent successor to Lemon).
33. Smith, supra note 2, at 934-35.
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mg free exercise rights as now at the core of Establishment Clause
cases in his lament that recent Free Exercise Clause cases have
supported the restriction of free exercise rights.'
Dean Smith's support of the legitimacy of a coercion test, as
opposed to Establishment Clause jurisprudence based on polity
principles, becomes apparent in his argument that the Founders
were men of the enlightenment who "may well have believed that
rights could be expanded but not contracted (in a ratchet like
sense), and that the right of religious exercise would be expanded
to provide a broader right of conscience. "35 He does not
view this as non-origmalism, but rather as the work of ongmalists
who are not narrowly deferential to text, "who endeavor to remain
true to the natural rights or libertarian aspirations of the Framers in
interpreting the Constitution. "36 Having accepted a coercion pnn-
ciple for all Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the problem for
Dean Smith centers on what he calls the "attenuation" problem,
which is to explore the cost to religions and the religious if free-
dom of conscience, rather than freedom of religion, become the
core of the coercion test and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.37
Professor Paulsen, like Dean Smith, favors coercion principles
as the best single test for Establishment Clause cases.3 He also
views Establishment Clause questions as limited to issues of indi-
vidual free exercise rights and is far more ringing in his endorse-
ment of the coercion test, with no polity principles, as a basis for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Professor Paulsen's objective is
to encourage the coercion test as the "doctrinal successor" to the
Lemon test.39 He writes:
I believe that the coercion principle, properly understood, is
the best single test of when government action violates the
Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment is about direct and indirect forms of govern-
ment compulsion in matters of religious exercise. The prin-
ciple may be summarized as follows: Government may not,
through direct legal sanction (or threat thereof) or as a
condition of some other right, benefit, or privilege, require
34. Id. at 948 & n.91.
35. Id. at 947.
36. Id. at 947 n.90.
37. Id. at 949-50.
38. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 797.
39. Id.
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individuals to engage in acts of religious exercise, worship,
expression or affiliation, nor may it require individuals to
attend or give their direct and personal financial support
to a church or religious body or ministry.
In forbidding government coercion to engage in reli-
gious activity, the Establishment Clause is the perfect com-
plement to the Free Exercise Clause, which also prohibits
direct and indirect forms of government compulsion in
matters of religious exercise. The two clauses protect a
single central liberty - religious freedom - from two
different angles. The Establishment Clause prohibits the use
of coercive power of the state to prescribe religious exer-
cise; the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the use of govern-
ment compulsion to proscribe religious exercise.4°
Professor Paulsen, like Dean Smith, does not like the statement
of coercion test principles by Justice Kennedy, because it is overly
concerned with private, as opposed to direct public coercion. He
argues, "There is language in Kennedy's majority opinion that is
greatly disturbing in its confusion of private and state action in
considering what should count as unconstitutional coercion. And
that confusion of private and state action is a point worth arguing
about."41 Paulsen opposes a principle of government neutrality to
religion and believes it is proper for government to aid religions.
Government must only not influence religious conduct. However,
unlike Dean Smith, Professor Paulsen supports the holding of the
Weisman decision. The invocation is a violation of his conception
of a coercion test.42 Professor Paulsen is even more adamant than
Dean Smith in his support of free exercise rights as at the core of
the Establishment Clause, his opposition to institutional entangle-
ment and political divisiveness principles, and his conflation of
polity and free exercise principles. He writes,
The First Amendment does require "separation" or "non-
entanglement," but it does so as a matter of the Free Exer-
cise Clause's protection of religion from government intru-
sion on personal and institutional religious autonomy That
is, religion may be entitled to a private sphere separate and
independent from government power and immune from its
40. Id. at 797-98 (footnotes omitted).
41. Id. at 821.
42. Id. at 799.
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regulations. It never was legitimate to use the idea of sepa-
ration to authorize discrimination against religion within the
public sphere.43
Paulsen is most adamant in his opposition to a separate exces-
sive entanglement prong of the Lemon test. He argues, "First, the
[excessive entanglement] test belonged on the free exercise side of
the com."" The entanglement test was not to be "a means of co-
ercing, promoting, or even endorsing religion." 45 Paulsen argues
only a religious person, or group, may claim government entangle-
ment under the Free Exercise Clause." There are no collective
institutional concerns about fears of religious and political conflict
in Paulsen's view of the entanglement test. However, he admits the
entanglement principle in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is still
alive, but in a "defanged" form, due to recent cases.47
V POLITY PRINCIPLES, WEISMAN, AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
Much evidence contrary to the Dean Smith and Professor
Paulsen view that the coercion test has become the sole or primary
standard of the Rehnquist Court exists. In the Weisman majority
opinion Justice Kennedy considers both polity and rights principles
and concerns. Only after considering polity-institutional-entangle-
ment-political divisiveness concerns does Kennedy move to issues
of the coercion of students and the freedom of conscience.48 In
addition, Justice Kennedy makes it clear that the Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Speech Clause, is a specific prohibition to
forms of state intervention into religious affairs which has no pre-
cise counterpart in the Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the Founders feared that de-
43. Id. at 810.
44. Id. at 809.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 809. It is interesting that although Paulsen views the entanglement prong as
too unprincipled and too subjective, he argues that the prayer in Weisman might have
been permitted under the Lemon test's no excessive entanglement prong because of the
nature of the guidelines that were given to clergy each year and the lack of entanglement
between school board and local clergy once they received the guidelines. Id. at 820
n.100.
48. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-58 (1992).
49. Id. at 2657 (The First Amendment protects freedoms of religion and speech differ-
ently: It spells out specific prohibitions on state interference with religion and no such
specificity for speech.).
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mocracy would be hurt if it were to dabble in religious ideas,
which may move to indoctrination.' The state protects individual
conscience, but it also is guided by polity/institutional norms as
well. These two concerns are not conflated under a liberty of reli-
gious thought, as Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen would have us
believe.
Kennedy is concerned about political divisiveness. He writes,
"The reason for the choice of the rabbi is not disclosed by the
record, but the potential for divisiveness over the choice of a par-
ticular member of the clergy to conduct the ceremony is appar-
ent."5' He continues,
Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision
respecting religions, and neither its existence nor its poten-
tial necessarily invalidates the State's attempt's to accom-
modate religion in all cases. The potential for divisiveness
is of particular relevance here though, because it centers
around an overt religious exercise in a secondary school
environment. 52
The fact that there is no real alternative way for the student to
participate in the graduation heightens for Kennedy the fear of
political divisiveness.53 Thus, while Justice Kennedy does not nec-
essarily view political divisiveness alone as a trigger to suggest a
denial of religious freedom, neither does he merely view coercion
of the individual child or of a member of the clergy as the only
concern the Court must examine in considering questions of estab-
lishment of religion. The fact that coercion of the child in this case
is enough to invalidate the prayer and that coercion can be a suffi-
cient cause of invalidating government establishment of religion,
does not mean that Kennedy believes that coercion alone may be
the only basis for the invalidation of government accommodation
of religion. Polity principles, such as no entanglement or political
divisiveness, may be a cause as well.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the preservation
and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility
50. Id. at 2658 (Justice Kennedy states that history teaches "the lesson that in the
hands of government what nght begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may
end in a policy to indoctnnate and coerce.").
51. Id. at 2655.
52. Id. at 2655-56.
53. Id. at 2656 (Justice Kennedy notes that, for all practical purposes, students are
obligated to attend graduation).
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committed to the private sphere.' The private sphere is to have a
freedom to pursue that mission.55 This notion of the difference
between the public and pnvate spheres, and the need for each to
be viewed in different and separate terms, is not the language of a
justice only thinking in terms of individual rights or free exercise
The language expresses concern about institutional separation. Ken-
nedy writes, "It must not be forgotten then, that while concern
must be given to define the protection granted to an objector or a
dissenting non-believer, these same Clauses exist to protect religion
from government interference."56 Here we see Justice Kennedy
speaking about protecting the rights of both believer and non-be-
liever, as well as religious institutions from government.
For Justice Kennedy, the school board demeans the democratic
process by acting in such a way as to devalue the participation of
members and demand a level of homogeneity 57 Dean Smith
views this point by Kennedy as an aside,5" when in fact the jus-
tice is referring to institutional, not individual conscience, aspects
of Establishment Clause principles. Nor does Smith deal with the
point by Justice Kennedy that when cultural or private coercion is
supplemented, or endorsed, by public action, it becomes almost
overwhelming by carrying the imprimatur of the state.59 That is,
he does not see that when an individual's conscience is tested by
the state endorsing religion, her conscience is devalued by govern-
ment.
An examination of the concurring opinions in Weisman offers
additional evidence that the Rehnquist Court will continue to apply
polity principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Justices
Blackmun, Souter, O'Connor, and Stevens view entanglement and
54. Id. ("The design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of reli-
gious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the pnvate sphere,
which itself is prormsed freedom to pursue that ussion.").
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2656-57.
57. Id. at 2656.
58. Smith, supra note 2, at 932.
59. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("The State's involvement m school prayers chal-
lenged today violates [the] central pnnciples [of the Establishment Clause]."). See also
School Dist. of Abmgton v. Schempp,. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1962) ("The wholesome
"neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the teach-
ings of history that powerful sects or groups might bnng about a fusion of governmental
and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that
official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of
one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment Clause prohibits.-).
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institutional concerns as Important strands of Establishment Clause
decisionmakmg.
In Blackmun's concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, we see the following institutional/entanglement/political
divisiveness argument: Government may not promote or affiliate
with any religious doctrine or organization, nor may it intrude itself
into the internal affairs of any religious restitution.6° Blackmun
draws on the wall of separation language in Everson v. Board of
Education.6' After stating the Lemon test, he writes, "After Lem-
on, the Court continued to rely on these basic principles in resolv-
ing Establishment Clause disputes." 62 To Blackmun, the prayer at
the Nathan Bishop Middle School violates the Lemon test.63
Blackmun notes that since 1971, in all but one of thirty-one Estab-
lishment Clause cases, Marsh v. Chambers, the Court has rested
its decisions on basic principles of Lemon, as it did m Board of
Education v. Mergens65 - allowing equal access for religious and
non-religious based groups to high schools.' Blackmun empha-
sizes that proof of government coercion is not a necessary, but is a
sufficient, condition to prove an Establishment Clause violation.67
Blackmun also notes that the First Amendment includes two dis-
tinct guarantees: that government shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion and that government not prohibit the free
exercise of religion.68
In contrast to the Paulsen and Smith analyses, Justices
60. Weisman, 112 S. CL at 2661-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2662. According to Justice Blackmun, Justice Black's opinon in Everson
provides the outline of the considerations that have become a fundamelital part of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Id (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947)). In Everson, Justice Black had expanded on Jefferson's wall of separation, enu-
merating the many ways m which government is forbidden to interact with religion.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
62. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2662 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 2664 (stating that prior decisions of the Court prohibit allowing the prayer
in this case).
64. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Upholding the use of a prayer to open sessions of the Ne-
braska legislature. The Court did not rely on Lemon and instead held that despite the
facts that a minister of the same denomnation had been used for a number of years and
was paid at the public expense, and that the prayers were Judeo-Christian, the prayer,
when weighted against historical background, was not invalid under the Establishment
Clause.).
65. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
66. Weisman, 112 S. CL at 2663-64 n.4 (Blacknun, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2664.
68. Id. at 2665.
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Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, as well as Justice Kennedy,
view individual rights and institutional aspects of the Establishment
Clause as separate and distinct, even though as with all constitu-
tional decisionmaking, justices differ as to the emphasis they place
on individual rights and polity principles. In this case Justice Ken-
nedy finds he does not have to resort to polity principles of entan-
glement. He is not, however saying they are not part of Establish-
ment Clause decisionmaking.
Most importantly, Justice Blackmun, joined by O'Connor and
Stevens, emphasizes, "When the government arrogates to itself a
role in religious affairs, it abandons its obligation as guarantor of
democracy Democracy requires the nourishment of dialogue and
dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine au-
thority above all human deliberation. '' 69 "The mixing of govern-
ment and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no
one is forced to participate."
7
The institutional separation of religion and government helps
both government and religious institutions. This is not an individual
coercion argument. Protecting democratic politics from conflict is
key to Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Blackmun writes, "To
that end, our cases have prohibited government endorsement of
religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, wheth-
er or not citizens were coerced to conform."
71
Moreover, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, offers a concurring opinion in which he argues that a
simple non-preference to the establishment of a single religion is
not the standard, because non-preferentialism requires the Court to
make theological distinctions, a polity or institutional problem for
Souter.72 The Constitution protects non-believers as well as believ-
ers from governmental, and Court, entanglement in religion.
Souter, after specifically referring to Michael McConnell's
scholarship on the coercion standard,73 writes, "But we could not
adopt that reading without abandoning our settled law, a course
that, in my view, the text of the Clause would not readily per-
69. Id. at 2666.
70. Id. at 2665.
71. Id. at 2667.
72. Id. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurrng) (Non-preferentialism requires courts to distin-
guish between sectarian and ecumemcal religious practices. The former would violate the
Establishment Clause while the latter would not.).
73. See generally McConnell, supra note 8.
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mit."74 Souter, in supporting stare decisis, a general polity princi-
ple with regard to the process of judicial review, and polity as well
as rights principles in the Establishment Clause, lists non-coercive
state laws which the Supreme Court has not allowed to stand in
the County of Allegheny v. ACLU,75 Grand Rapids School District
v. Ball,76 and Epperson v. Arkansas.77
Moreover, Justice Souter also rejects "'non-preferential' state
promotion of religion" as constitutionally permissible, whether or
not there is proof of coercion." For Justice Souter, even though
this case is concerned with freedom of conscience for believer and
non-believer alike, this does not mean that the Establishment
Clause is to be evaluated only under an individual rights test.79
Therefore, Justices Souter, O'Connor, Stevens, Blackmun, and
Kennedy have all indicated that polity, institutional principles, will
and should play a role in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Dean Smith admits the importance of polity principles to these
justices when he argues that it is difficult to view the Rehnquist
Court as moving towards a simple coercion test."° Smith notes
that Blackmun emphasizes that in prior Supreme Court cases, the
Court has prohibited state endorsement of religion, its sponsorship,
and "active involvement in religion, whether or not citizens are co-
erced."8 '
In making his argument for the Rehnquist Court moving to a
coercion standard, Smith understates the significance of Justice
O'Connor's use of the endorsement test rather than the coercion
test as articulated by Justice Kennedy in Weisman. Smith justifies
this by arguing that the focus of his article is on the meaning of
and justification for the protection of conscience.8 2 He fails to rec-
74. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2671 (Souter, I., concurrmng).
75. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding the display of a creche in the county courthouse
during the holidays is an mpermissible government endorsement of religion).
76. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding supplementary program offering remedial and ennch-
ment courses to non-public school students impermissibly promotes religion even though
the courses were not religious classes).
77. 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in state
supported schools or universities is not religiously neutral).
78. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (Souter, I., concurring).
79. See id. at 2676-77 ("Concern for the position of religious individuals in the mod-
em regulatory state cannot justify official solicitude for a religious practice unburdened by
general rules ").
80. Smith, supra note 2, at 957-58 (contending that both the majority and dissent
relied on diffenng versions of the coercion test).
81. Id. at 932 (quoting Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Blackmun, I., concurring)).
82. Id. at 927 n.27.
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ognze that a government endorsement test has within it institu-
tional or polity principles about the separation of church and state,
not only principles about the free exercise rights of individuals.
Smith limits his concerns about both the endorsement and
coercion tests to their indeterminacy when they stand alone. For
Smith these tests will only have meaning when we have clear
standards as to whether they refer to religion or conscience. 8
3
Smith's definition of indeterminacy as the core problem in Estab-
lishnent Clause cases leads him to disregard a full range of issues
which are central to fully evaluating the coercion test and whether
the Rehnquist Court has moved, or is moving, toward viewing
Establishment Clause cases in individual free exercise rather than
polity/institutional terms.
In opposition to the major premise of his article, Dean Smith
notes that Justice Kennedy has moderated his views on the right of
conscience as the basis for Establishment Clause decisions" and
that Justice Brennan's plurality decision, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens, in Texas Monthly v. Bullockl5 made reference
to endorsement, not coercion, as the government action being ques-
tioned.86  Moreover, Smith argues that Texas Monthly and
Weisman demonstrate the inclination of the Rehnquist Court "to
move toward an Establishment Clause jurisprudence based on ac-
commodation (in a nonpreferential way) of conscience; however,
the Justices have neither justified nor explained the reasons sup-
porting such a move."8" They have not justified such a move af-
firmatively because as yet there is not a majority to do so.
VI. THE LEMON TEST IS NOT DEAD: ITS SEEDs ARE MERELY
SCATTERED
Professor Paulsen argues in the early pages of his article that
the Lemon test is dead and has been replaced with a coercion test.
83. Id. at 928 n.27.
84. See id. at 927 n.26.
85. 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (The Court concluded that the state's narrow sales tax ex-
emption for religious publications was a violation of the First Amendment since it ap-
peared to be a clear case of state sponsorship of religion. The Court held that when there
is a subsidy granted by the state that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and the
subsidy "either burdens nonbeneficianes markedly or cannot be reasonably seen as remov-
ng a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion," it sends a mes-
sage of endorsement.).
86. Smith, supra note 2, at 927 n.27.
87. Smith, supra note 2, at 950.
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Paulsen writes:
My proposition m this article is that the Court has indeed
interred the Lemon test and replaced it with the coercion
test, albeit one of uncertain parameters and an uncertain
future. I do not mourn Lemon's passing. There was much
that was dreadfully wrong with Lemon dunng its approxi-
mately twenty-year life and we are better off without it. I
come not to praise Lemon, but to bury it.88
Paulsen continues, "Let the joyous word be spread, Lemon v.
Kurtzman at last is dead!"89
The Lemon test requires that a government law or conduct 1)
have a secular purpose; 2) have a "primary effect" that "neither
advances nor inhibits religion"; and 3) not foster "excessive entan-
glement" of the state with religion.' ° Paulsen argues that the test
has major flaws and is quite ambiguous, and "packaging the test as
one in which all three requirements must be satisfied compounded
these problems by cumulating them."9 ' The major problems with
the test for Paulsen are the following: 1) it improperly assumes
that "the Establishment Clause imposes a constitutional disability
on religion;"92 2) it is not protective of the freedom of religion,
which he views as the primary objective of the Establishment
Clause;93 3) it does not allow government accommodation of reli-
gion; 94 4) it (incorrectly) assumes that the Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clauses have different objectives - one to stop gov-
eminent accommodation of religion, the other to allow free exer-
cise of religion.95 For Paulsen, the Establishment Clause is-not an
"anti-religion" counterweight to the "pro-religion" Free Exercise
Clause.9 Rather, like Smith, Paulsen believes protection of reli-
gious liberty is the objective of both Religion Clauses.97
88. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 797.
89. Id. at 799.
90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
91. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 800-01.
92. Id. at 801.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 801-02.
96. Id. at 801.
97. In so doing, Professor Paulsen is presenting a synopsis of the argument he devel-
oped m a previous article. See Michael S. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitu-
lion: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DANM L. REv. 311, 313 (1986) (Paulsen maintains "that the Establishment Clause protects
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Paulsen argues the following points in support of the death of
the Lemon test: 1) the "primary effects" prong of the Lemon test is
undermined in Bowen v. Kendrick,98 Mueller v. Allen," and
Widmar v. Vincent;" 2) Justice Kennedy provided the key fifth
vote in Kendrick, a case in which religious organizations were
allowed government support for abortion and sexual counsel-
ing;"' 1 3) since 1989, five justices have not supported some as-
pect of the Lemon test;102 and 4) Mergens, Allegheny County and
Texas Monthly are evidence that there is no majority for the Lemon
test.
10 3
However, within the Paulsen article there is evidence that the
Lemon test may not be as dead as he boldly declares. He admits
that Blacknun supports Establishment Clause principles of no
government preference for religion, no entanglement in religious or-
ganization, and no endorsement tests, institutional separation aspects
of the Lemon standard." 4 He also correctly views the concern of
Justices Souter, Stevens and O'Connor for following precedent as
indications that principles within the Lemon test may not be
dead.' °5
Paulsen admits that it is Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by
religious liberty, it safeguards much the same interests as the Free Exercise Clause but in
a slightly different way. The Free Exercise Clause defines the important individual liberty
of religious freedom while the Establishment Clause addresses the limits of allowable state
classifications affecting this liberty.").
98. 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (holding federal grants to organizations providing services or
conducting research related to teenage sexual relations and pregnancy did not have the
effect of advancing religion despite allocation of funds to religiously affiliated orgamza-
tions).
99. 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota tax law allowing parents who send
their children to private schools to deduct educational expenses as satisfying the primary
effect inquiry).
100. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (allowing religious groups free access to a state university
forum created for student groups did not have the primary effect of advancing religion).
See also Paulsen, supra note 2, at 811 (discussing the reinterpretation of the primary
effect prong to more closely equate substantive neutrality).
101. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 811.
102. Id. at 812-13.
103. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990); Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). See also Paulsen,
supra note 2, at 819 ("In the Court's three most recent Establishment Clause decisions,
Texas Monthly, Allegheny County, and Mergens, the Lemon test had failed to command a
majority.").
104. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 824.
105. Id. at 824-25 (noting Justice Souter's remarks that "we could not adopt that read-
ing without abandoning settled law") (citing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2671
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring)).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, rather than
the majority opnon in Weisman, which declares the Lemon test
dead."°6 He validly argues, "One should always be wary of such
declarations of doctrinal death in dissents," especially since Scalia
overstates the degree to which psychological coercion is "the very
linchpin of the Court's opinion." 1°7
In less ringing language than in the early stages of the article,
Paulsen writes, "It is fair to read Weisman as having quietly dis-
carded the [Lemon] test."108 Paulsen tries to explain the failure of
Kennedy's majority opinion in Weisman to formally declare Lemon
dead, while arguing that it has been interred, as Kennedy's need to
engage in "artful formulations" of the standard as required by the
needs of a majority opinion writer on a Court in which the other
four justices oppose a simple coercion test."
In so doing, Paulsen incorrectly suggests that Kennedy's Alle-
gheny formulation of a coercion test is both a doctrinal minimum
and maximum for Justice Kennedy This argument is only valid if
we do not take seriously the polity principles and views about the
Court's role and stare decisis that Justice Kennedy supports in the
joint opinion with Justices O'Connor and Souter in the Casey
decision.
Finally, Paulsen admits, "There is room to fear backsliding,
especially by Justice Kennedy," the critical fifth vote." ° He
views the possibility of backsliding if there is "some unnatural
marriage of the coercion test to O'Connor's endorsement test -
sort of a 'coercion-by-endorsement test that (sometimes) deems
'coercive' state action that 'endorses' religion in a sufficiently
strong sense to be deemed government 'proselytization..' It is
interesting that Paulsen views the coercion test, which he argues is
replacing the Lemon test, as also unclear and unstable.'
Further evidence that the Lemon test is not dead is that Justice
Blackmun, joined by Stevens and O'Connor, goes well beyond co-
ercion as a test of government establishment of religion.1 For
106. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 821.
107. Id. at 821 & n.102 (quoting Weisman at 2681).
108. Id. at 822.
109. Id. at 822-25 (arguing that Kennedy's opimon merely papered over the Court's
differences).
110. Id. at 862.
111. Id. at 862-63.
112. Id. at 862 (noting that divisions m the Court make the new standard both unclear
and unstable).
113. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2664-67 (1992) (Blackmnun, ., concurnng)
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these justices coercion is sufficient, not only necessary, in order to
find an Establishment Clause violation. In addition, Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, not only rejects the
coercion test as a limiting principle, but adds the notion, as in the
Casey joint opinion, that settled law requires its maintenance.114
Paulsen invalidly concludes that Justice Kennedy thinks coercion is
all that the Establishment Clause prohibits.Y5 He also incorrectly
argues that: "It is clear, then, that the real doctrinal majority con-
sists of Justice Kennedy and the four Weisman dissenters. The
emergence of this new doctrinal majority is the big news of the
case."" 6 Paulsen then hedges his bets, and indicates concerns
about Kennedy's reliance on coercion as the sole Establishment
Clause test, when he writes, "If Kennedy indeed remains in the
'coercion' camp, then it may be further concluded that Weisman
has not only interred the Lemon test, but has replaced it with some
form of coercion test."
17
VII. THE CASEY DECISION, THE REHNQUIST COURT, AND FUTURE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
To understand why the Rehnquist Court will not eschew polity
principles within the Establishment Clause, we must realize that the
Rehnquist Court, like the Court eras before it, makes decisions
based on a constitutive decisionmaking process which fashions
choices from polity and rights principles. The 1992 Court Term is
no exception to this rule. It shows the Rehnquist Court developing
key polity and rights principles to guide future Court
decisionmaking. We also must emphasize that general polity princi-
ples that are held by justices, and stated in contemporaneous cases
that are outside the primary doctrinal area under discussion (Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence here), can inform the future direction
of that doctrinal area better than reading a recent case (Weisman).
The Supreme Court's landmark abortion decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,"8 especially the rare joint plurality opinion
(stating that the government must do more than restrain from compelling religious activity
- it must also not engage in religious activities because to do sends a message of exclu-
sion to people who do not practice the endorsed beliefs).
114. Id. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring).
115. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 825.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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by Reagan/Bush appointees O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, is
such a contemporaneous decision. It has important implications for
whether a majority of the Rehnquist Court will disregard polity
principles in the Establishment Clause, past precedents, and the
Lemon test. Moreover, it confirms that individual justices, including
Justice Kennedy, and the Court as a collective decisionmaking
institution, make constitutional choices based on both individual
rights values, and key polity principles, including: a commitment to
stare decisis, Supreme Court autonomy from the majoritarian politi-
cal system, and the role of the Court as a counter-majoritarian
institution in our system of checks and balances. Casey is a land-
mark decision because it sets out polity principles for this Court to
follow in the future, not only on abortion rights, but in other doc-
trinal areas.
To understand the landmark decisions, of the 1992 Term, in-
cluding Planned Parenthood v. Casey as well as Lee v.
Wetsman," 9  RA.V v. St. Paul,120  and United States v.
Fordice,12 1 we must keep in check our usual tendencies to think
of the Supreme Court as a policy-making institution, concerned
mainly with fundamental rights and following the majority coalition
in power. To understand these decisions, we must focus on both
important rights principles and polity principles. The first polity
reason that the Casey joint opinion gives for reaffirming Roe v.
Wade" is the Court's continuing commitment to stare decists, or
following precedent: "The obligation to follow precedent begins
with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.""z
The plurality makes it clear that a commitment to precedent is an
important source of Court legitimacy in a system of checks and
balances.
Moreover, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy craft an
important new test in Casey for when the Court should overturn
past decisions. The joint opinion states that decisions will only be
overruled if they 1) prove unworkable in practice, 2) cause inequi-
ties in effect, 3) damage social stability, 4) are abandoned by soci-
ety, or 5) rely on key fact assumptions which have changed.24
119. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (graduation prayers).
120. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (hate speech).
121. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (university desegregation).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992).
124. Id. at 2809.
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Applying this test to Roe v. Wade, the plurality finds that it meets
none of the conditions.125
In addition, the joint opinion states, "Some of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but
that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the lib-
erty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."12 6 A commit-
ment to developing polity and rights principles guides all but the
most conservative (onginalist) justices, leading the plurality in
Casey to reaffirm the central holding of Roe and strengthen the
right of abortion choice: "the reservations any of us have in reaf-
firming the central holding in Roe are outweighed by the expli-
cation of individual liberty we have given combined with the force
of stare decists."
127
Most important, the justices in Casey emphasize the polity
principle that the Court is and should be autonomous of the politi-
cal branches of government. Justice Blackmun, for example, in a
concurring opinion states that since its founding, our country "has
recognized that there are certain fundamental liberties that are not
to be left to the whims of an election." 28 This concern that the
Court remain a counter-majoritarian institution prevents it from
following the lead of the majority coalition or the policy wants of
individual justices. Rather than follow the lead of political or cul-
tural elites, the Court seeks to uphold precedent, the rule of law,
and its legitimacy Casey shows three Reagan/Bush appointees, and
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, committed to the polity principle
of maintaining the Court's autonomy, even though that means
rejecting the Bush administration's policy wants, as well as the
personal policy wishes of individual justices.
Evidence for the Court's commitment to autonomy as an im-
portant polity principle abounds in Casey. The joint opinion makes
frequent mention of the danger to the Supreme Court's legitimacy
that would come from overturning Roe. The joint opinion recogniz-
es the "political pressure" on the Court to overturn Roe, but fears
"an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court
staked its authority in the first instance." "29 The plurality further
recognizes that "to overrule under fire in the absence of the most
125. Id. at 2809-12 (the Court considers and rejects each reason).
126. Id. at 2806.
127. Id. at 2808 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurrng in part and dissenting m part).
129. Id. at 2815.
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compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert
the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question." 130 Finally,
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion seems to offer a clear re-
buke of the Bush administration: "What has happened today should
serve as a model for future Justices and as a warning to all who
have tried to turn this Court into yet another political branch."'
3 1
Thus, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun and
Stevens each hold polity principles that do not trust the
majoritanan political system to protect individual rights. In Casey,
these key polity principles are a respect for stare decisis, a com-
mitment to Court autonomy from politics, and a concern for the
Court's legitimacy and the rule of law In addition, we see alterna-
tive polity principles in Chief Justice Reliquist's, Justice
Thomas's, and Justice Scalia's deep trust of the political system to
decide questions of individual rights.
The cases in the 1992 Term suggest that there are two groups
of justices. One group, consisting of O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy,
Blackmun, and Stevens hold polity principles that favor stare deci-
sis, the rule of law, and continuing the place of the Supreme Court
as a counter-majoritarian institution in our system of separation of
powers. A second group, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia and Thomas hold polity principles that are
more trusting of majontanan politics to resolve individual rights
questions; principles would undermine the settled constitutional
rights when they personally disagreed with them. The first group of
justices have staked out a new path for the Court - rejecting the
origmalist position of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, thus main-
taming a commitment to the rule of law and developing polity and
rights principles.
Justices also hold different views of what rights principles are
at issue in Casey and how much the political system can be trusted
to protect these- prmciples. Most important, Casey shows that rights
principles are not static, but continue to evolve as our nation
changes. The plurality gives greater voice than ever before to a
new right of personhood which complements and even enlarges the
right of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut,32
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2845 (Blackmun, J., concurmng m part and dissenting m part).
132. 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (holding that mamage Is "withm the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and striking down a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives).
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Eisenstadt v. Baird,133 and Roe v. Wade." 4
It is true that the Court m Casey somewhat restricts the ability
of women to procure an abortion from the near absolute right of
privacy in Roe. This is due to a heightened recognition of the
states' interest in protecting potential life. The point is not that the
Rehnquist Court supports Roe v. Wade root and branch, for obvi-
ously it does not. What is important is that Casey demonstrates
that polity and rights principles evolve in such a way that the
Court refuses to think of itself as merely a policy-making institu-
tion. Casey is more than a confirmation of the central premise,
even if in weakened form, of Roe v. Wade's creation of a woman's
right to abortion choice. Casey, when read in the light of the other
landmark cases of this extraordinary Court session, is a clear state-
ment that Justices Souter, O'Connor, and (most surprisingly) Ken-
nedy have decided to make constitutional choices based on the
precedents of the past and in light of the new complexities of life
in the United States.
An analysis of Lee v. Weisman,'35 in light of the polity prin-
ciples in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, offers additional evidence
that the Rehnquist Court will not end constitutive decisionmaking
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Justice Kennedy refused to
uphold a junior high school's use of prayer at graduation ceremo-
nies despite encouragement from the Bush administration to do
so. 136 As in Casey, Weisman shows traditionally "conservative"
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter staking out polity and
rights principles to guide the Court in the future.
The Weisman majority emphasizes the Court's autonomy from
politics and the need for the Court to follow established precedents,
rather than resorting to policy wants. Justice Kennedy states that
"the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious
133. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the nght of privacy guarantees that a person,
mamed or single, should be free from "unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
136. Brief for the United States as amtcus curiae at 28, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) The United States argued that there were no elements of
coercion in Rabbi Gutterman's invocation; rather, there were "mere acknowledgements of
*a belief in God." Id. No one was forced to attend the graduation and, if they did attend,
were not forced to participate in any religious activity. Id. The United States also noted
that a nomnal amount of public money was spent on the portion of the graduation re-
volving the rabbi Id. Because of all these circumstances, the United States argued that
the graduation invocation and benediction did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
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exercises in primary and secondary public schools compel the
holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an uncon-
stitutional one." 37 Far from treating precedent as merely a means
for procuring policy objectives, Justice Kennedy is reaffirming the
Court's commitment to the First Amendment, thereby placing it
above his personal preference for school prayer.
The Weisman majority also emphasizes the Supreme Court's
autonomy from the majoritanan political system. As in Casey, the
Court rebuffs the Bush administration's attempt to lead the Court:
"Thus we do not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the
United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. ,138 In language nearly identical to Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey, the majority emphasizes the need to maintain
Court legitimacy as an important polity principle: "To compromise
that principle today would be to deny our own tradition and forfeit
our standing to urge others to secure the protection of that tradition
for themselves." 139 Justice Souter, in a concurring opinion, em-
phasizes the value of Court autonomy- "We have not changed
much since the days of Madison, and the judiciary should not
willingly enter the political arena to battle the centripetal force
leading from religious pluralism to offi6ial preference for the faith
with the most votes."" ° One could hardly ask for a more clear
statement of Court autonomy and the importance of counter-
majoritanan polity principles to protecting individual rights.
In addition to Casey, a number of other cases from this Term
show the Court's commitment to polity and rights principles and
rejection of its following election returns and personal policy-mak-
ing. United States v. Fordice141 and R.A. V v. St. Paul142 each
show the Court developing polity and rights principles to guide it
in the future. In both Fordice, and PA.V., the Court surprised
many by reaffirming, even strengthening, key equal protection and
First Amendment principles. In Fordice, the Court - in a unani-
mous decision - reaffirmed that public universities and colleges
must seek to eliminate de facto discriminatory practices if those
practices lack clear educational purposes and result from prior de
137. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
138. Id. at 2655 (refemng to Lemon v. Kutzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
139. Id. at 2658.
140. Id. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring).
141. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
142. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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jure discrimination. 143 All nine of the justices took note of the
important precedents in the field of school desegregation and the
increasing importance of university education to minority empower-
ment.
In R.A.V., the Court confronted another divisive political issue
- hate speech." In the first examination of a hate speech stat-
ute since Beauharnais v. Illinois,14' all nine justices affirmed the
First Amendment and the Court's commitment to preserving First
Amendment content neutrality and overbreadth doctrines. Hate
speech is a divisive issue within both the academic community and
the wider public. In RA. V v. St. Paul, the Court, rather than wait-
Ing for leadership from the political branches, reasserts the First
Amendment as a rule -of law 146 Additionally, the Court empha-
sizes the polity principle of a concern for majoritanan laws that re-
strict free speech. The Court seems to raise its scrutiny of "fighting
words" restrictions in response to recent issues of minority-imposed
"politically correct" speech regulations. 47 This is not a case of
individual justices simply imposing their policy wants, for there
can be little question that each justice is personally opposed to hate
or bias-motivated speech. Justice Scalia's majority opinion makes
this clear: "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a
cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without
adding the First Amendment to the fire." 48  Casey, Fordice,
A.V., and Weisman are arguably the most significant Supreme
Court decisions of 1992. Together they show that justices have
rejected the lead of the dominant political coalition and their per-
sonal policy wants, in favor of reaffirming and strengthening key
polity and rights principles. The Rehnquist Court, like all Court
eras, bases its decisions on polity and rights principles which
evolve as the nation evolves. Throughout the changing political
143. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2735 ("Our decisions establish that a State does not dis-
charge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its
prior de jure dual system that continues to foster segregation.").
144. LA.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538.
145. 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1952) (upholding a hate speech law in Illinois but suggest-
ing agreement with the wisdom of the law or commenting on its efficacy).
146. KA.Y., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
147. Id. at 2549 (noting the possibility that selective proscription of messages relating to
race, gender or religious intolerance "create the possibility that the city is seeking to
handicap the expression of particular ideas").
148. Id. at 2550.
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winds the Court shows a concern for stare decists, autonomy, and
legitimacy
We can expect from the Rehnquist Court in the future a
change in Establishment Clause jurisprudence from a simple reli-
ance on the Lemon test, root and branch. We also can expect the
Rehnquist Court to maintain Establishment Clause polity principles
that were central to the Founders, Establishment Clause precedents,
and the Lemon test.
VIII. CONCLUSION: POLITY PRINCIPLES WILL REMAIN CENTRAL
TO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Founding Establishment Clause Principles
Neither Professor Paulsen nor Dean Smith focus in their arti-
cles on ongmalist and non-ongmalist arguments for or against the
legitimacy of the coercion test. Nor will I here. However, it is
important to note that Smith's and Paulsen's rejection of polity
principles as central to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, their
resting the Establishment Clause solely on a free exercise-based
coercion test, radically undermines, and improperly simplifies, the
Founders' objectives in writing the Establishment Clause and dis-
tinguishing it from the Free Exercise Clause.
Smith has redefined the values of the Founders to those of
only free exercise rights, not polity principles in the Establishment
Clause that are to protect American government from religious
conflict. Thus, for Smith the unit of concern is who is being co-
erced. It is a free exercise rights concern. Smith narrows Establish-
ment Clause issues to questions of individual freedom or liberty
Smith's view that "the incidence of coercion (as to religion or
nonreligion) is minimized near the accommodationist middle of the
first continuum" is only valid if one accepts the assumption that
coercion of individuals, and individual rights, is the only, or prima-
ry, objective of the Establishment Clause. 49 Smith limits the unit
of analysis for Rehnquist Court concerns under the Establishment
Clause to a rights principle: that the government should not impose
its values on an individual person's freedom of religion, or, for
those supporting a wider coercion test, an individual's freedom of
conscience."5 There is no discussion, or concern, by Smith about
basing Establishment Clause questions on the polity principles in
149. Smith, supra note 2, at 926.
150. Id. at 940.
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the Establishment Clause, such as that the government should not
entangle itself in religion, and that the government limit the politi-
cal divisiveness caused by making policies which endorse or sup-
port religious institutions. Given this individual rights only, not
polity-principled, look at the Establishment Clause, Smith views
government coercion of individual free exercise of religion as po-
tentially greatest at the endorsement and exclusion poles of his
continuum."1
In making this point, I am not arguing for or against the prem-
ise that the Establishment Clause establishes a wall of separation
between government and religion. Nor need I make such an argu-
ment. It is sufficient to say, in support of the Founders' placing of
polity principles within the Establishment Clause, that they feared
that political conflicts over religion would severely damage the
governance of the republic. This was a concern of the Founders, in
and of itself, separate and distinct from their support of the free
exercise of religion. Polity principles in the Establishment Clause
were not merely instruments, nor were they to be viewed instru-
mentally - as Smith, Paulsen, and other supporters of the coercion
test do - as means to ensure the free exercise of religion.
If we were to conflate church and State institutional separation
polity principles into principles about the direct protection of indi-
vidual or group rights, as Smith, Paulsen, and supporters of the
coercion standard favor with regard to the Establishment Clause,
we would radically change the nature of these principles, under-
mine their foundational legitimacy and moral force, and radically
change the Supreme Court's constitutive decisionmaking process in
these doctrinal areas.
B. The Instrumentalism of Smith and Paulsen
Unfortunately, in their support of a coercion test and opposition
to reliance on both polity and rights principles and a constitutive
decisionmakmg process in the area of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, both Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen seem to be fol-
lowing an instrumental, outcome-oriented approach. Paulsen re-
quires the Court only to consider the specific effects of a law or
government action - whether it coerces the free exercise of reli-
gion.5 2 Paulsen argues for the coercion principle in Establish-
151. Id. at 924.
152. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 804.
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ment Clause jurisprudence because it will limit the secular indoctri-
nation of students in schools and offer no problems with govern-
ment aid to religion, at a level not above that of secular public and
private schools. The coercion test will not place restrictions on
government aid to religious schools and thus will not produce
outcomes as in Lemon v. Kurtzman,153 Aguilar v. Felton54 and
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,'55 which he views as
wrongly decided. Also, the coercion test would not allow the Court
to invalidate a law because of the religious motives of the persons
or government officials who favor it.
Smith argues that the replacement of liberty or freedom of
religion with liberty of conscience may do much to protect against
the establishment of religion if the class getting benefits is expand-
ed beyond religion.156 However, Smith reverts to a bottom-line
"who gets what when and how" analysis of the move to a protec-
tion of liberty of conscience, rather than a principled separation of
church and state, polity and rights-based discussion of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
In so doing Smith is engaging in a similar level of
consequentialism that so many have argued is the problem with
Lynch v. Donnelly157 which, for some, has been corrected by the
Weisman case. Moreover, the fear for Smith is that for the Court
to protect all freedom of conscience is not to accommodate reli-
gion. He fears Congress will limit religious rights as it limits rights
of conscience, what he calls "the attenuation problem." 58 He
fears dilution of religious liberty by an expanded freedom of con-
science and polity principles.'59 This is based on a (mistaken)
view that the role of government is to affirmatively accommodate
religion under the Establishment Clause. He does not see the place
of the Establishment Clause as ensuring that government not get
entangled in religion, a principle, along with free exercise prnci-
ples, which will protect religion to a greater degree in the long
run. Smith's failure to discuss the polity principles within the Es-
tablishment Clause undermines a full discussion of how to protect
both freedom of religion and freedom of conscience.
153. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
154. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
155. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
156. Smith, supra note 2, at 949.
157. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
158. Smith, supra note 2, at 949-50.
159. Id. at 950.
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Furthermore, Smith's view of religion-free schools as not neu-
tral, as fostering what some have called secular humanism, has
within it an assumption that government is to accommodate reli-
gion to a greater degree than many of the Founders, and non-
ongmalist stare decists, has allowed in the past. It assumes that
religion is to be a part of schools as institutions. At a very general
level, no religion in schools is not neutral.
C. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Without Polity Principles
What Smith and Paulsen like most is that the Court will not be
able to apply polity, or institutional, principles in the Establishment
Clause and the Lemon test, which would prohibit the accommoda-
tion of religion when there is a fear of entanglement and fear of
political divisiveness between government and religion. As explored
above, these Establishment Clause principles are not simply related
to the free exercise concerns of believers, non-believers, or mem-
bers of religious organizations. It is simply misleading and simplis-
tic to assume that polity principles in the Establishment Clause
lead to a strict "wall of separation" stance, as is evident in Mueller
v. Allen. 60
Also, while it is true that polity principles such as entangle-
ment and political divisiveness allow the Supreme Court some
discretion in their application, as we saw in Lynch v. Donnelly, for
example, polity prmciples are no more indeterminate than employ-
ing a coercion or non-endorsement test. However, without such
tests, important principles within the Establishment Clause will be
undermined, principles other than a simple concern for free exer-
cise rights. If the Establishment Clause was simply a protection of
free exercise rights, there would be no need for it.
The emphasis on individual rights, rather than on free exercise
and polity principles in the Establishment Clause, will undermine
the full range of protections in the Establishment Clause - free-
dom from religious conflict, entanglement, political divisiveness, as
well as freedom from state violations of individual and group free
exercise rights. The primary question should not be solely whether
there should be protection of conscience for non-believers, but
whether the Establishment Clause is merely concerned with free-
dom of conscience.
Finally, Dean Smith discusses Michael Perry's eloquent discus-
160. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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sion of "ecumenical politics," which he describes as a politics of
dialogue and tolerance "in which beliefs about human good, mclud-
ing disputed beliefs are central."' However, I question whether
dialogue will be possible without a reliance on (non-ongmalist)
polity principles m the Establishment Clause. A dialogue built on
non-coercion, free exercise rights principles, alone, will undermine
principles of institutional separation. Such principles are necessary
for the dialogue not to be a product of majority religious or ethical
relativist values. The primary question is not whether there should
be dialogue on such issues, but whether we will have Establish-
ment Clause principles without polity principles, which will result
in government and majority religious or ethical values drowning
out the voices and needs of those with minority religious and ethi-
cal values. Perry's failure to consider Federalist Number 10162
fear of majority faction principles in the Establishment Clause
undermines my faith in his call for dialogue. 63
The instrumentalism of supporters of the coercion test who
seek government support of religion has similar qualities, as does
Perry's call to trust politics to deliberate and decide transcendent
values. Neither takes seriously foundational polity and rights princi-
ples which question whether we should trust government in matters
of religion and conscience. This shortcoming is similar to the non-
Euclidian political science, law, and relativist democratic theory of
the 1950s.164 Happily, a majority of the Rehnquist Court justices,
161. Smith, supra note 2, at 953 (quoting MICHAEL 3. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: T1E
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MoRA.rry IN AMERICAN POLInCS 43 (1991)).
162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (for example, Madison wrote, "Com-
plaints are everywhere heard that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of
rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according the rules of Justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbear-
mg majority.").
163. See generally PERRY, supra note 156. See also Ronald C. Kahn, Pluralism, Civic
Republicanism, and Critical Theory, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1475 (1989) (for the thesis that
Michael Perry undermines his own arguments about the counter-majoritanan nature of the
Supreme Court, that we cannot trust politics to make moral choices and the important
role of the Supreme Court as a forum for defining the aspirational values in the Constitu-
tion when he argues that the Supreme Court should practice judicial self-restraint rn cases
where there is conflict over basic (liberty) values such as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). See MICHAEL PERRY, MORALrY POLmCS & LAW 172-79 (1988)).
164. See KAHN, supra note 11, at 133-97, 330-79, 382-459, for a discussion of how
instrumental approaches to Supreme Court decisionmaking and constitutional theory, that
are built on non-Euclidean principles, and thus eschew the importance of foundational
polity and rights principles, have led to our misunderstanding the process df doctrinal
change in the Warren, Burger and Rehnqust court eras. Instrimental approaches also
disregard the role of constitutional theory and the interpretive community in that process.
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including Justice Kennedy, has not chosen to take the path advo-
cated by Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen. It has not chosen to
accept a coercion test and deny the polity principles in its Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, as indicated by the Lee v. Weisman
case. Nor has it chosen instrumentalism over constitutive
decisionmaking, as indicated by Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The
state of American politics, the Court, religious institutions, and the
free exercise rights of the religious and non-religious are better off
for the path taken by the Rehnquist Court.
See also Owen M. Fiss, Objectvity and Interpretation, 34 YALE L.J. 739, 746-50 (1982)
(defining the term -interpretive community" and arguing its importance m the process of
doctrinal change).
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